The First Line of Defense

Many of US ports are foreign-operated.

Since 9-11 the UAE has been a strong ally in the War on Terror, as far as arresting terrorists, tracking illicit funding of terror, inspecting goods before they come to the US, and providing facilities for our military to prosecute the war. These protests smack of political opportunism. See the WSJ, "Ports of Gall: The new protectionists use national security as their cover."

And it's Islamophobia. (See Larry Kudlow)

Quite a turnabout for those critics of the Patriot Act and NSA surveillance, and of the war in Iraq. Apparently they will fight on the union docks, if nowhere else.

US port security remains in the hands of Homeland Security, with work done by American longshoremen.

The best security, though, according to those who have looked at the issue carefully, is achieved overseas, and needs to be more broadly defined. Veronique de Rugy, "Bipartisan Hysteria is Not Security":

Our nation's port security shouldn't rely on who owns what in our ports. Effective port security should keep terrorists and their bombs as far as possible from U.S. shores. In other words, securing U.S. ports at home should be our last line of defense. Not our first.

Our first line of defense should be to make sure that terrorists do not get the dangerous materials necessary to build a bomb. The most cost effective solution would be to keep close tabs on fissile materials. It is easier to monitor a lump of uranium at a known location than to detect uranium smuggling. Part of this exercise might include buying foreign stockpiles or helping foreign governments protect or destroy their stockpiles.

Our second line of defense should be security mechanisms to prevent nuclear devices from arriving in the United States. For instance, we should help officials abroad to tighten security at the foreign ports that feed shipments to the U.S. These efforts could include helping fund systems to bolster foreign countries' ability to detect nuclear material in their ports or placing U.S. agents on site in foreign ports.

Another cost-effective strategy would be to create partnerships with foreign manufacturers and importers. Partners would agree to meet "supply chain" standards establishing a secure chain of custody for every unit of cargo traded overseas. This would ensure that their shipment methods repel potential terrorist attempts to use those shipments for introducing weapons of mass destruction into our ports.

Finally, our last line of defense should be direct on-site protection at local ports. Security measures could include fencing, surveillance cameras, and thorough background checks for foreign companies operating ports in the U.S. Of all defense strategies, on-site port protection is the least cost effective. It is hard to detect highly enriched uranium and almost impossible to detect anything if it is shielded. As such, the effectiveness of the detection devices in use now is dubious. And even if the detection devices were capable of detecting dangerous material, it would still be riskier than the other solutions because the stakes are so high: if the system fails, the illicit material ends up inside the country.

Our current policy focuses on local ports while overlooking the most cost effective security measures. Out of a $2.03 billion port security budget, only $200 million is spent on programs to secure foreign ports. And according to experts, we barely spend $250 million protecting stockpiles of fissile material abroad.

By obsessing about the nationality of a respected ports operator, instead of thinking about what would actually make our nation safer, members of Congress are not enhancing American security.