Keep the Pressure on AQ in Iraq

The liberal-leaning Washington Post is cynical, but grudgingly reports a positive shift in Iraq's prospects, and an emerging consensus that we must not give back to terrorists our hard-earned gains. WaPo:

Intentionally or not, a new assessment of Iraq's political and military prospects landed just in time to bolster President Bush's case that the United States should maintain its troop buildup in the country and stand by its beleaguered government.

The consensus report by U.S. spy agencies contained a veiled warning: Any move to shift U.S. troops out of their role directly combating insurgents could squander the modest security gains secured by the troop surge.

"A change of mission ... would place security improvements at risk," the report concluded.

That conclusion, coming unanimously from the nation's 16 intelligence agencies, will likely help the administration and its ground commander in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus, argue for patience from a skeptical Congress and public. [snip]

Colin Kahl, a former Pentagon analyst and now an assistant professor of national security studies at Georgetown University, said the intelligence community is aware that the timing of the new report _ just nine months after the last intelligence estimate on Iraq _ looks political. It was dropped this week into the dead calm of an official Washington in the middle of summer vacation.

"I think those working on the NIE were well aware that it would be politically controversial, but I don't get the sense that this was done in the service of helping Petraeus or the administration," said Kahl. "I get the sense that some within the (intelligence community) thought it was unnecessary, and unprecedented, to do another Iraq NIE so close on the heels of the last one."

One senior intelligence official said, however, that the timing was intentional _ designed to inform decisions to be made about Iraq strategy this summer and fall. The official spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the issue more candidly.

Back from a recent trip to Iraq, Rep. Brian Baird (D-WA):

As a Democrat who voted against the war from the outset and who has been frankly critical of the administration and the post-invasion strategy, I am convinced by the evidence that the situation has at long last begun to change substantially for the better. I believe Iraq could have a positive future. Our diplomatic and military leaders in Iraq, their current strategy, and most importantly, our troops and the Iraqi people themselves, deserve our continued support and more time to succeed. [snip]

From a strategic perspective, if we leave now, Iraq is likely to break into even worse sectarian conflict. The extremist regime in Iran will expand its influence in Iraq and elsewhere in the region. Terrorist organizations, the people who cut off the heads of civilians, stone women to death, and preach hatred and intolerance, will be emboldened by our departure. In the ensuing chaos, the courageous Iraqi civilians, soldiers and political leaders who have counted on us will be left to the slaughter. No American who cares about human rights, security and our moral standing in the world can be comfortable letting these things happen.

And Charles Krauthammer welcomes the new seriousness of some Democrats, joining us in reasoned debate and the effort to find workable solutions:

Serious people like Levin argue that with a nonfunctional and sectarian Baghdad government, we can never achieve national reconciliation. Thus the current military successes will prove ephemeral.

The problem with this argument is that it confuses long term and short term. In the longer run, there must be a national unity government. But in the shorter term, our assumption that a national unity government is required to pacify the Sunni insurgency turned out to be false. The Sunnis have turned against al-Qaeda and are gradually switching sides in the absence of any oil, federalism or de-Baathification deal coming out of Baghdad.

Krauthammer advocates letting the dysfunctional "unity" Maliki government fall, replaced by a new coalition of parties, or a new election. Frederick Kagan, Weekly Standard, on what the NIE really says. Maliki may not be as weak as portrayed, but a peaceful parliamentary re-shuffle would be fine. And this assessment:

The document itself is nevertheless weak. It significantly downplays important developments in Iraq on both the political and the military fronts. The NIE minimizes the efforts of the Iraqi Security Forces by focusing too heavily on the question of their ability to operate independently. It mentions only two significant ISF operations, both in Baghdad (although it notes that the ISF has met its goals for deployment of units in support of the Baghdad Security Plan, which was a Congressional benchmark), but ignores the following important activities undertaken by Iraqi Army units in recent months:[snip]

Kagan enumerates them, and then this:

That's tens of thousands of Iraqi Army soldiers, National Police, and local police fighting on the front lines against both al Qaeda and JAM. Can they sustain themselves logistically, move themselves, etc.? No. But that's only the metric of success if your objective is to withdraw. If your objective is to win, then what matters is how well they're fighting. Remember that most American allies depend heavily on the U.S. for many sorts of logistics, fire support, command and control, and so forth. The Iraqis have a way to go, of course, but we need to be realistic about the bar we're trying to set, and the obsession with the ability of Iraqi units to fight without any American help is foolish. [snip]

And the key point is that Sunni Arabs who want to fight AQI are not asking to be set up in their own militias or local defense forces, but are asking to join the Iraqi Security Forces. Given the heavily Shia character of those forces, the Sunni will find it hard to turn their young soldiers and police into some sort of coup or civil war force.

On the political leadership:

The second question is: how long do we have before failure to achieve national reconciliation begins to undermine local, grassroots movements? That question can't be answered either, of course, but there are some points worth noting. The grassroots movement has developed rapidly and spontaneously, and it continues to spread rapidly and spontaneously. It has now grown into important movements in almost all of Central Iraq. The Sunni Arab community may continue to be fragmented, as the NIE notes, but what is new is the appearance of groups of local Sunni leaders who are both willing to negotiate with the Coalition and able to deliver on their promises. This means the emergence of a new Sunni leadership that is likely to press its demands and desires on recalcitrant Sunni politicians in the Parliament, who were selected before the Sunni Arab community had decided to participate actively in Iraqi politics.

Max Boot, WSJ on the Vietnam analogy. Ralph Peters, NY Post "Anbar is Changing". Peggy Noonan, WSJ toasts the troops. As Kagan states:

Critics of the current strategy can use parts of the NIE to raise concerns about the political process in Iraq. Using those concerns to justify abandoning the current strategy, as the NIE itself clearly states, will jeopardize the enormous progress already made against al Qaeda in Iraq, which remains a potent threat that could reconstitute itself rapidly if we lifted the pressure from it. The fact that we have achieved a great deal without yet achieving all of our objectives is not grounds for abandoning a successful strategy. It is grounds for continuing it.

Keep the pressure on al-Qaeda in Iraq. It's working. We are on Freedom's Watch.